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Can We Just Say No?
I. INTRODUCTION
Two things in life are certain: death and taxes. This Note is
not about taxes. Everyone dies. Some die suddenly and unex-
pectedly; for others, death is expected, and it comes after its vic-
tim .has ,had time to reflect on life and prepare for death.
Americans are increasingly concerned with decisions about death
and dying. In particular, the choice between dying or existing in
an unconscious state with no hope of recovery has caused many
Americans to document their wishes.
In 1983, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(the Commission) published a report which examined the situa-
tions in which a patient's choice to refuse life-sustaining treatment
may be limited on moral or legal grounds.' In addition to clarify-
ing the moral and legal issues, this report suggested appropriate
procedures for competent and incompetent patients to make med-
ical treatment decisions. The report also discusses the role that
particular public and private agencies should play in creating and
regulating these procedures.'
One of the Commission's conclusions was that
state courts and legislatures should consider making provision
for advance directives through which people designate others
to make health care decisions on their behalf and/or give in-
structions about their care. Such advance directives provide a
means of preserving some self-determination for patients who
I PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
M ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS (U.S.G.P.O. Mar.
1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT].
2 Id at 2.
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may lose their decisionmaking capacity. Durable powers of
attorney are preferable to "living wills" since they are more
generally applicable and provide a better vehicle for patients to
exercise self-determination, though experience with both is
limited.3
At the time of the Commission's report few states had statutes
which provided for advance directives.4  , Following the
Commission's report, many state legislatures responded by adopt-
ing living will statutes.5 This flurry of legislation, in turn, pro-
voked much scholarly criticism.6
The legal issues involved with refusal of medical treatment,
discontinuation of medical treatment, living wills, and health care
powers of attorney have become popularly known as "right to die"
issues.7 Right to die issues are very complex, in part because this
area of law has evolved, and continues to evolve, out of legal ante-
cedents which are logically in tension with one another.
The most basic of these legal antecedents is the law'of bat-
tery. The law of battery protects individuals from nonconsensual
bodily contact, which includes unauthorized medical procedures.8
This doctrine has produced a legal right not to be treated without
consent, and a requirement that the consent be informed. The
3 Id. at 5.
4 The first statute of this nature, the California Natural Death Act, was adopted in
1976. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185 (West Supp. 1992). Between 1976 and
1979, nine states in addition to California, enacted living will laws. Between 1981 and
1984 twelve other states enacted similar% laws. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HAND-
BOOK OF 1985 LIVING WILL LAWS 5 (1986) [hereinafter 1985 LIVING WILL LAWS].
5 "Living will statute" is used as a generic term for the statutes that authorize living
wills. States call them natural death acts, death with dignity acts, or rights of the termi-
nally ill acts. From March 4 to July 1, 1985, thirteen states adopted living will statutes.
1985 LIVING WILL LAWS, supra note 4, at 5.
6 See, e.g., Carol Ann Mooney, Indiana's Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act:
A Reform Proposal, 20 IND. L. REV. 539 (1987); Joseph P. Baumann, Jr., Note, The Right to
Die in New Jersey: Another Plea For Legislation, 18 RuGERS .J. 235 (1986); Gina K. Grimes,
Note, Changing Attitudes in Florida's "Right to Die" Law, 14 STETSON L. REV. 375 (1985);
Barbara Miltenberger, Comment, The Dilemma of The Person In A Persistent Vegetative State:
A Plea To The Legislature For Help, 54 Mo. L. REV. 645 (1989); Karen M. Moran, Note,
The Conflict Continues: Who Decides Treatment Questions For Tie Terminally-Ill Incompetent Pa-
tient, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 641 (1984); Melinda H. Organ, Comment, Withholding Life-
Sustaining Treatment From The Incompetent Patient: Tim Need For Statutoy Guidelines, 17 Loy.
U. CHI. LJ. 427 (1986).
7 This label comes from early judicial opinions in this area. See, eg., John F. Ken-
nedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In re
Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. 1975). The term "right to die" usually applies when
an individual's decision is likely to cause the patient's death.
8 See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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informed consent requirement has evolved into an affirmative
right to refuse medical treatment.9
The right to refuse treatment theoretically conflicts with the
principles of criminal law." While the law of battery has spawned
the right to refuse medical treatment, criminal law principles limit
this right when an individual's decisions lead to the individual's
death.
In addition, the right to die raises both substantive and proce-
dural issues. The central procedural question is at what point, if
any, must medical decision-making get judicial approval;" this
Note does not address procedural issues.'2 The central substan-
tive issue is which patients are permitted to refuse treatment, and
which patients are required to accept treatment; 3 this Note en-
gages the substantive issue.
The purpose of this Note is to urge state lawmakers to reeval-
uate their right to die legislation, and to suggest some substantive
issues that they should address. Part II reviews the bases of the
right to die. 4 Part III examines modern "right to die" legislation.
Part IV is an analysis of the legislative efforts of selected states and
seeks to show ambiguities and inconsistencies that should be cured
by remedial legislation.
II. BASES FOR THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
Traditionally, courts have based the right to refuse medical
treatment on the constitutional right to privacy, 5 common law
9 See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 13 (1989).
10 See In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 751 (Wash. 1983) ("Under Washington's criminal
code, homicide is 'the killing of a human being by the act, procurement or omision of
another,' . . . and it is murder in the first degree when, '[w]ith premeditated intent to
cause the death of another person, [one] causes the death of such person.' Thus, the
potential for criminal liability for withdrawing life sustaining mechanisms appears to ex-
ist.") (emphasis added).
11 MEISEL, sup6ra note 9, at 6.
12 For a thorough discussion of the procedural issues associated with the right to
die, see Id. at 145.
13 Id. at 5.
14 Although the right to die is the common label given to this area of law, the
author will refer to it as the right to refuse medical treatment hereafter. This area of law
is evolving; the suggestions and analysis in this Note should not be confused as an en-
dorsement of more controversial issues such as active euthanasia.
15 See Severns v. wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Super-
intendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical, Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1
(C.P. P. Div. 1980); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
19921
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rights, 6 or a state statute.1 7 The lack of differentiation among
the bases of this right is the result of the courts' view that its
scope does not depend upon which basis the court relies upon for
the source of the right. However, a right to refuse medical treat-
ment based on a constitutional right is a stronger right than one
based on common law principles."8 This Part surveys each basis
for the right to refuse medical treatment and considers cases that
have upheld the right on each basis.
A. The Constitutional Right of Pririacy
Some litigants have asserted that their right to refuse medical
treatment is based on the United States Constitution. In most
cases the litigants claim that the right to refuse medical treatment
arises out of the constitutional right of privacy, but occasionally lit-
igants assert other constitutional sources.'
9
The United States Supreme Court identified a general right of
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut." Although the Court has never
addressed the question of whether the right to refuse medical
treatment is included in the right to privacy, the Court has said
that the freedom to care for one's health and person is protected
by the right to privacy.21 Interpreting these words, some state
courts have held that a terminally ill adult has a constitutionally
protected right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
22
16 See, e.g., Eichner v. Dillon, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1980). See infra notes 64-75 and
accompanying text.
17 Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). See infra notes
118-139 and accompanying text.
18 Id. at 540-41 ("Common-law rights can be abrogated by statute in the exercise of
the State's police powers subject only to due process requirements . . . Constitutional
rights on the other hand cannot be so abrogated.").
19 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (free exercise of religion, and
right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment).
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a
Connecticut statute because it restricted the right of married persons to use contraceptive
devices. Id. The majority opinion struggled to find a textual basis for the right of privacy;
the constitutional basis Justice Douglas relied on for this new right was the penumbras
and emanations of several guarantees in the Bill of Rights. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL, CON-
SrITuTIONAL LAW 686-87 (1986). We can only determine the scope of the right of privacy
by examining subsequent cases. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
21 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
22 See, e.g., Severns v. Wilhingtos Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del.
1980); Superintendent of Bilchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass.
1977); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663; Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1
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1. In re Quinlan"
Karen Ann Quinlan suffered severe neurological damage
which left her in a persistent vegetative state. 4 Medical experts
concluded that she had no reasonable chance of regaining con-
sciousness;25 a mechanical respirator kept her alive by sustaining
her respiratory functions.26 Joseph Quinlan, Karen's father, ini-
tiated guardianship proceedings to have Karen adjudicated incom-
petent and to have himself appointed as her guardian. 27 More-
over, Mr. Quinlan sought specific power, as her guardian, to au-
thorize the discontinuance of mechanical life-support.
28
Mr. Quinlan presented three constitutional arguments to ob-
tain authorization to discontinue Karen's treatment. The first
two-that forced continuation of medical treatment violated the
right to free exercise of religion and constituted cruel and unusu-
al punishment-were quickly disposed of.
Mr. Quinlan's third argument was that Karen had a privacy
right to refuse further treatment.30 The court found that the con--
stitutional right of privacy, found in both the state and federal
(CP. P. Div. 1980); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Wash. 1983).
23 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
24 Id. at 653-54. A persistent vegetative state is a state where the "subject . . . re-
mains with the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of the neurological function but
who . . . no longer has any cognitive function." Id. at 654.
25 Id- at 654.
26 d. at 655.
27 Id. at 651. These proceedings were initiated after Karen's doctor refused Mr.
Quinlan's request to have Karen's respirator disconnected. Id. at 656.
28 Id. at 651.
29 Mr. Quinlan asserted that forced continuation of Karen's treatment violated both
Karen's and his constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. Id. at 661. Mr.
Quinlan asserted, derivatively, Karen's constitutional rights and his own independent
rights as Karen's father. Id. at 660. The court "simply stated, the right to religious beliefs
is absolute but conduct in pursuance thereof is not wholly immune from governmental
restraint." Id. at 661. The court concluded "that, ranged against the state's interest in the
preservation of life, the impingement of religious belief, . . . , does not reflect a consti-
tutional question, in the circumstances at least of the case presently before the [c]ourt."
Id. The court did not "recognize an independent parental right of religious freedom to
support the relief requested." Id. at 661-62.
Mr. Quinlan also asserted that continuation of treatment was tantamount to cruel
and unusual punishment. The court noted that the Eighth Amendment protection "is not
relevant to situations other than the imposition of penal sanctions." I& at 662. The court
found that the conditions inflicted upon Karen by fate and nature, not the state nor the
law, were cruel and most unusual, "yet [they] do not amount to 'punishment' in any
constitutional sense." Id.
30 Id. at 664.
1992]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
constitutions, is broad enough to encompass an individual's deci-
sion to refuse medical treatment.3 ' To preserve Karen's ability to
exercise her right despite her condition, the court authorized
Karen's guardian, her father Joseph Quinlan, to substitute his best
judgment as to whether Karen would exercise her right to refuse
this treatment if she was competent to do so. 2 The court decid-
ed that the best way to protect Karen's constitutional rights was to
allow her guardian to exercise "substituted judgment."3
The New Jersey Supreme Court felt that these types of deci-
sions should be made by the patient's family, the patient's doctor,
and reviewed by the hospital ethics committee, if the hospital has
one. 4 To require judicial approval for treatment decisions would
be cumbersome and an inappropriate interference with the medi-
cal profession.3 5
2. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz 6
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the
Quinlan court to the extent that the constitutional right to privacy
includes the right to individual free choice and self-determination,
and that self-determination included the right of both competent
and incompetent patients to refuse medical treatment.3 7 However,
the Massachusetts court rejected the approach in Quinlan and held
that judicial authorization is required before the patient's family
or doctor could discontinue the medical treatment of an incompe-
tent patient.
38
The Saikewicz court required that an adversarial judicial pro-
ceeding be conducted to protect the rights of a patient that has
31 Id. at 663.
32 Id. at 664. The court concluded that Karen's rights could be asserted on her
behalf by her father; the court also concluded that there is no parental constitutional
right that would entitle him to discontinue Karen's treatment on its own. Id.
33 Id. Substituted judgment is one approach to determining what health care deci-
sions an incompetent patient would make if the patient was competent. A surrogate deci-
sion maker is required to make the decision for an incompetent patient based on the
subjective preferences the patient expressed before becoming incompetent. See MEISEL,
supra note 9, at 267. For a critical analysis of the doctrine of substituted judgment and
surrogate decisionmaking, see Michele Yuen, Comment, Letting Daddy Die: Adapting New
Standards For Surrogate Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L REV. 581 (1992).
34 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 668-69.
35 Id. at 669.
36 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
37 Id. at 424.
38 Id. at 434-35.
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been adjudicated incompetent.3 9 The court would appoint a
guardian' ad litem to argue the position opposite of the
petitioner's.' The court would consider the factors that a compe-
tent patient would consider under these conditions, and determine
which choice the incompetent patient would have made if they
were competent. The court would substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the incompetent patient.
41
The differences between the courts' approaches have generat-
ed several questions. The Quinlan court decided that judicial inter-
vention in these cases is unwise;42 the Saikewicz court determined
that judicial intervention is the best way to protect the patient's
interests.' Writers disagree about what is the proper role for the
judiciary in these cases.H
3. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health45
Recently, the United States Supreme Court faced issues con-
cerning an individual's right to refuse medical treatment. The
Missouri Supreme Court established a procedural safeguard which
requires clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent pa-
tient would choose to discontinue medical treatment before treat-
ment could be discontinued. The primary issue in Cruzan was
whether this requirement was an unconstitutional -procedural ob-
stacle to the exercise of a fundamental right.4 The Court held
that it was constitutional for Missouri to require a heightened
evidentiary standard where a guardian of a person in a persistently
vegetative state sought to discontinue artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion to that person.47
39 Id. at 433.
40 i.
41 Id. at 434.
42 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
43 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44 Compare Arnold S. Relman, Tie Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L.
& MED. 233 (1978)(arguing that lengthy court proceedings may unnecessarily prolong the
life and suffering of an incompeteot patient) zith Charles H. Baron, Medical Paternalism
And The Rule of Laws: A Reply To Dr. Reiman, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 337 (19.79) (suggesting
that a physician should do anything possible to prolong the life of a patient, and only
terminate treatment after judicial authorization has been granted).
45 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
46 Id. at 2851. For the purposes of this case, the Court assumed that a competent
person had a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
Id. at 2852.
47 Id. at 2851-52.
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Although the majority did not announce a constitutionally
protected right to refuse medical treatment in Cruzan, strong lan-
guage in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion may signify that
the Court will recognize this right in the future.4" Justice
O'Connor wrote separately to emphasize that the Court did not
consider this question;49 she stated that in her view, the state may
"be constitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest
in refusing medical treatment."
50
B. Common Law Rights
State courts have given the common law right to be free from
physical invasions of bodily integrity many different labels. This
right is protected through the doctrine of informed consent5 '
and is often referred to as a right of privacy, 2  self-
determinism," a right to control one's own body, 4 or autono-
my.
55
The first case to recognize the right of bodily self-determinism
was Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford.5" The Supreme Court stated,
"[n]o right is . . . more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to ... control his own per-
son. 5 7 The most commonly quoted source of the common law
right to refuse medical treatment is Scholendorff v. Society of New
York Hospitals.5  In his now famous opinion, Justice Cardozo stat-
ed, "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has the
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
48 Id. at 2858 ("[tloday's decision, . . . does not preclude a future determination
that the Constitution requires the States to implement the decisions of a patient's duly
appointed surrogate.").
49 Id. at 2857.
50 Id.
51 Organ, supra note 6, at 430.
52 See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662 (N.J. 1976).
53 See In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 950 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 436 (N.J.
1987); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223
(N.J. 1985).
54 See Bouria, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300; Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1221; Fa-eI, 529 A.2d at
410; Eichner v. Dillon, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y 1981).
55 MEISEL, supra note 9, at 50-51.
56 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
57 Id. at 251.
58 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
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surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault."59
Traditionally, the remedy for violating a person's right to
refuse medical treatment has been a cause of action for assault or
battery.' Other potential remedies include tort actions for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress," negligent infliction
of emotional distress,62 and invasion of privacy.'
1. In re Eichner'
The New York Court of Appeals held that prior judicial autho-
rization for the discontinuance of medical treatment from termi-
nally ill patients is not mandatory.' Brother Joseph Fox suffered
cardiac arrest during a hernia operation.66 The cardiac arrest re-
sulted in substantial brain damage; Brother Fox could not breathe
spontaneously, and was put on a respirator which maintained him
in a vegetative state. The attending physician contacted Father
Phillip Eichner, and informed him that Brother Fox had no rea-
sonable chance of recovery.'
Father Eichner requested that the hospital remove the respira-
tor, but the hospital refused to do so without court
authorization.69 Father Eichner instituted judicial proceedings to
be appointed guardian of the person and property of Brother
Fox.7° During the hearing, the medical evidence established that
59 Id. at 93.
60 See, eg., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
61 See Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 364-65 (Cal.
CL App. 1986); Spring v. Geriatric Auth., 475 N.E.2d 727, 732-34 '(Mass. 1985); Leach,
469 N.E.2d at 1055.
62 See Bariing, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 365; Spring, 475 N.E.2d at 732-34.
63 S&e Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1530 (D. Colo.
1987) (claims for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and discrimination
under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794); Saunders v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
64 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
65 Id. at 74.
66 1d. at 67.
67 Id
68 Id. Brother Fox was a member of a Catholic religious order, the Society of Mary,
which operated Chaminade High School in Mineola, NY. Father Eichner was the
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Brother Fox would never recover from the vegetative coma, or
regain his cognitive functions.
71
Father Eichner also presented evidence that Brother Fox had
made it clear, before his hernia operation, that under these cir-
cumstances he would want the respirator removed.72 Because of
the medical prognosis and the clear evidence which demonstrated
that Brother Fox did not want to be maintained in a vegetative
coma by use of a respirator, the court allowed Father Eichner to
order the withdrawal of the respirator.73
The court of appeals did not recognize that the right of priva-
cy included the right to refuse medical treatment.74 The court
noted that other states had given the right to refuse medical treat-
ment constitutional protection, but the court did not "reach that
question in this case because the relief granted . . . is adequately
supported by common-law principles."
75
2. In re Storar76
In re Storar was a companion case to Eichner, and was .also
based on common law principles. John Storar was a fifty-two year
old mentally retarded resident of a state mental facility. He had a
mental age of eighteen months, and had lived in the state facility
since he was five.77 Doctors discovered that John had cancer of
the bladder, and he was admitted to a hospital. 8 His mother,
who was his legal guardian, tried to withdraw consent for life-pro-
longing blood transfusions.79 The New York Court of Appeals or-
dered the blood transfusions to continue. The court did not use
the substituted judgment doctrine because John was never compe-
tent; he had never been able to make an informed decision re-
garding medical treatment.s ° The court decided that the state's
71 Id. at 68.
72 Id. In 1976, in the context of a community discussion of the moral implications
of the Quinlan case, Brother Fox agreed with the New Jersey Supreme Court decision,
stating he would not want to be kept alive by extraordinary means under those circumn-
stances. Brother Fox reiterated his position several months before the operation. Id.
73 Id. at 74. A case that is factually similar to, and follows, Eidiner is Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1 (C.P. P. Div. 1980).
74 Id. at 70.
75 Id.
76 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
77 Id. at 68.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 69.
80 Id. at 72-74.
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parens patriae interest prevailed over Mrs. Storar's attempt to
exercise John's common law and constitutional right.8 2 The court
of appeals emphasized that prior judicial procedures were optional
in New York.' Doctors and families of an incompetent patient
could seek a judicial determination if the legal ramifications of
their actions were uncertain.' The court of appeals stated that if
it was desirable to expand the judicial role in decisions involving
the discontinuance of medical treatment from incompetent pa-
tients, the legislature should define the courts' role.'
C. Mixed Cases
Some courts have founded the right to refuse medical treat-
ment on both common law principles and constitutional provi-
sions.
The Washington Supreme Court, in In re Colyer,16 considered
the issue of an incompetent patient's right to refuse medical treat-
ment. The court based its decision on the constitutional right of
privacy and the common law right to be free from bodily inva-
sions.8s
Bertha Colyer sustained cardiopulmonary arrest. She was resus-
citated, but her body was deprived of oxygen for ten minutes. She
entered a persistent vegetative state and was unable to breathe
without the assistance of a respirator.' s ,
Bertha Colyer's husband was appointed her guardian, and
petitioned the superior court to authorize the removal of the
respirator." The superior court granted Mr. Colyer's request, but
stayed its order so that the Washington Supreme Court could
81 Parens patriae is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take
care of themselves, such as juveniles and the insane. BLACK'S LA, DICTIONARY 1114 (6th
ed. 1990).
82 Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 73.
83 Id. at 74.
84 Id.
85 Id.
.86 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
87 Id. at 741-43. The court based the right on the state and federal constitutions.
The court engaged a question other courts have ignored: does state action exist so that
the federal right can be applied against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?
The Washington court found state action in this case. Id. at 742. See also In re Spring,
405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980).
88 Id. at 740.
89 IR
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review the decision.9" The Washington Supreme Court upheld
the decision because they found no compelling state interest that
outweighed Bertha Colyer's right to refuse medical
treatment.9' The court held that judicial intervention in every
decision to withdraw life sustaining treatment is not required. 92
The court adopted procedures similar to those used in Quinlan.9"
The court noted that this case was factually similar to Quinlan, but
the court did not abdicate the authority of the courts in this ar-
ea.94 The court suggested that judicial intervention may be re-
quired in a case similar to Saikvicz.95
In cases that require a judicial determination, Colyer estab-
lished that the court's role is to determine if the evidence demon-
strates that the patient would have refused treatment if they were
competent.
96
III. STATUTORY ADVANCE DIREcTrvEs.
When a person is competent, refusing unwanted medical
treatment is fairly simple, but when a person becomes incompe-
tent the exercise of that right becomes problematic. An over-
whelming majority of states have enacted statutes that provide a
way, or ways, for individuals to plan for medical decision-making
should they become incompetent. These statutes are generically
known as living will statutes, natural death acts, or durable power
of attorney statutes. These statutes provide a mechanism for exer-
cising the right to refuse medical treatment even after an individu-
al has become incompetent.97
These statutes authorize individuals to execute advance direc-
tives. An advance directive is a "means by which competent indi-
90 Id.
91 Id. at 744. The court considered four state interests: the preservation of life; the
protection of the interests of innocent third parties; the prevention of suicide; and the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 743.
92 Id. at 746.
93 Id. at 745-46.
94 Id. at 746.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 750-51.
97 In most states the substantive legal basis for the right to refuse treatment is im-
plicit. See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 54. Some states, however, explicitly enunciate the sub-
stantive rights. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West Supp. 1991); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.07 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322




viduals . . . give instructions about their health care that are to be
implemented at some later date should they then lack the capacity
to make medical decisions."98 Living wills and durable power of
attorneys for health care are two types of advance directives. Ad-
vance directives are intended to provide a means for decision-mak-
ing for patients who are no longer capable of making their own
health care choices.
Advance directives are of enormous value to individuals who
want to plan for the future. If a person is competent, they can
make their own health care decisions'as they are needed. If they
want to refuse a particular medical procedure, they can; this right
is protected by the common law doctrine of informed consent.'
Persons who are incompetent can no longer participate in deci-
sions relating to their own health care.100 Incompetent patients
cannot make health care decisions contemporaneously, but, if
their state legislature has enacted a statute allowing advance direc-
tives, they can, while competent, make these decisions in ad-
vance.1
01
Although some courts have recognized common law advance
directives, 102 one court has held that its state's natural death act
preempted common law rights.0 In some states the common
law regarding advance directives is not developed, or common law
advance directives are not recognized. 10 4 Unless the individual
resides in a state where the common law recognizes advance direc-
tives, he runs the risk of not having his wishes enforced if he does
98 MEISEL, supra note 9, at 312.
99 See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text!
100 See MEISEt, supra note 9, at 176 ("The concept of incompetence first distinguishes
between those persons who are entitled to exercise decision-making prerogatives and
those who are not."); see also RuTH FADEN & TOM L BEAUcHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEO-
RY OF INFORMED CONSENT 287-88 (1986).
101 State statutes are not the sole means by which an advanced directive can be exe-
cuted. See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 359-60.
102 See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla.
1984).
103 All but one court that has addressed the issue has concluded that natural death
acts do not preempt common law rights to make advance directives. The only court to
hold otherwise is the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,
425 (Mo. 1988), afld sub nora., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841
(1990). See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
104 See Saunders v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)(the court said it
could not recognize the validity of a living will without a legislative enactment declaring
the directive to be legally binding).
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not execute a statutorily authorized advance directive. For this
reason statutorily authorized advance directives are superior.
A. Uniform Acts
The National Commissioners on Uniform State Law adopted
the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Acte"5 in 1985, and sev-
eral states have adopted it since then."'6 In 1989, the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Law approved a completely re-
vised version of the act. 0 7 When originally proposed, this act was
referred to as the Uniform Natural Death Act.'
The Model Health-Care Consent Act"° was approved by the
National Commissioners on Uniform State Law in 1982. The act is
very narrow in scope and is designed only to provide assistance in
cases that occur routinely in medical practice." 0 The act has
been adopted in one state."'
Other uniform laws have been proposed, but none have been
wholly adopted. In 1982, the legal advisory committee of Concern
for Dying drafted the Uniform Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Act." ' The Society for the Right to Die drafted the Medical
Treatment Decision Act."3
105 9B U.LA. 609 (1987). For a critical analysis of the Uniform Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act, see Marguerite A. Chapman, The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: Too
Little, Too Late, 42 ARK. L. REV. 319 (1989); Thomas J. Marzen, Uniform Rights of the Ter-
minally Ill Act: A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 441 (1986).
106 ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-201 (Michie Supp.
1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.1 (West 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (Vernon Supp.
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-101 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (1991); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101 (West Supp. 1992).
107 9B U.L.A. 79 (Supp. 1991). This act supercedes the 1985 act. One state, Maine,
has adopted the 1989 version of the act. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701 (West
Supp. 1991).
108 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETINGS IN ITS NINETIETH YEAR !36, 76 (1983).
109 9 U.L.A. 453 (1988). For a critical analysis of the Model Health Care Consent
Act, see Alexander M. Capron, Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Health Care Consent Act:
Considerations Against Adoption, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 513 (1983); Theodore R. LeBlang, Uniform
Law Commissioners' Model Health Care Consent Act: An Overview, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 479
(1983).
110 MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENT ACT, 9 U.LA. 453, 454 (1988).
111 See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-1 (West 1992).
112 See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 336. This act is reprinted in the PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION REPORT, supra note 1, at 428.
113 See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 336. This act is reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 313.
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B. Natural Death Acts.
A large majority of states have enacted statutes that govern
the execution and enforcement of advance directives for decision-
making about life-sustaining treatment1 1 4 These acts are, generi-
cally known as natural death acts and living will statutes. The di-
rectives executed pursuant to one of these statutes are often called
living wills.11 5 However, it is important to distinguish between a
common law advance directive and a statutorily based advance
directive.
Natural death acts serve the same purpose as common law
advance directives, but the statute gives the directives a certain
legal basis for foregoing life-sustaining treatment. Statutorily based
advance directives can be used to refuse or consent to medical
treatment in advance.
1 1 6
Natural death acts are not intended to permit everyone to
refuse medical treatment under all circumstances. Most statutes
manipulate the definition of three terms-"qualified patient," "ter-
minal condition," and "life-sustaining procedure"-to describe which
individuals can execute a statutory advance directive, which types
of treatment they can refuse, and under what circumstances these
114 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-1 (1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201 (1986); CAL
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-101
(West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570 (West 1991); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16 §
2501 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.01 (West 1986);
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-1 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-1 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4502 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-1 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,101 (1985 & Supp.
1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.622 (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1
(West Supp. 1991); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145B.01 (West Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-101 (Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 449.535 (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:1 (Supp. 1991);-N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:211-8 (West Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-1 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-320 (1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.605 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-10
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANti. § 34-12D-1 (Supp. 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 32-11-101 (Supp. 1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.001 (West
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1101 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5251 (1987);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1.-2981 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010 (Supp.
1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-1 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01 (West 1989); WYO. STAT.
§ 35-22-101 (1988 & Supp. 1991). See also supra notes 106-107.
115 MEISEL, supra note 9, at 356.
116 See DEL. CODE ANN. it. 16, § 2502(c) (1983); IND. CODE AiNN. § 16-8-11-10 (West
1992); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (1990); N.H. RE%,. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:1
(Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1105 (Supp. 1991).
1992]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
treatments can be refused.1 7 However, as long as the statute
does not preempt common law rights, a person who falls outside
of the group described by the statutory definitions may execute an
advance directive based on common law rights. The only effect of
not falling into the statutorily defined group is that such a person
cannot execute an advance directive pursuant to the statute. The
statutorily authorized directives are more readily recognized and
followed because the statutes make clear the rights and liabilities
not only of the patient but also of the health care providers. One
case particularly emphasizes the importance of identifying the
rights of the patient and the liabilities of the health care provid-
ers.
The California courts considered the issues of discontinuing
treatment to an incompetent patient in a unique context. In Bar-
ber v. Superior Court" two doctors, who had ordered the re-
moval of all life-sustaining equipment and intravenous feeding
tubes from a patient in a persistent vegetative state, were charged
with murder."9
Mr. Clarence Herbert suffered a cardiorespiratory arrest while
recovering from an operation. Mr. Herbert was in a deeply coma-
tose state and was placed on life-support equipment. His chances
for recovery were poor.
120
Mr. Herbert had not executed an advance directive pursuant
to California's Natural Death Act.' 21 After receiving a written re-
quest from Mr. Herbert's family, the two physicians removed the
respirator and other life-support equipment. 12 Mr. Herbert con-
tinued to breathe. The physicians consulted with Mr. Herbert's
family, and two days after the respirator was removed, the doctors
ordered the removal of the intravenous feeding tubes which pro-
vided hydration and nourishment. 21 Mr. Herbert eventually
died.
24
The two doctors were charged with murder.2 A municipal
court dismissed the indictment, but the superior court reinstated
117 MEISEL, supra note 9, at 366.
118 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
119 Id. at 486.
120 Id.
121 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185 (West Supp. 1992).
122 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. The doctors were also charged with conspiracy to commit murder. Id.
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the charges. 126 The doctors sought a writ to prohibit the prose-
cution.
The court of appeals issued the writ and held that the state's
natural death act is not the exclusive basis for terminating life-sus-
taining treatment. 12 The court of appeals held that the doctors'
failure to continue treatment; though intentional and with kriowl-
edge that Mr. Herbert would die, was not an unlawful failure to
perform a legal duty.128 The court concluded that a physician
has no duty to continue to treat a patient in a comatose state
once the treatment has been proven to be ineffective. Since there
is no criminal liability for a failure to act unless there is a legal
duty to act, the doctors' conduct was not unlawful.
12 9
The court outlined a test for deciding whether a particular
treatment is reasonably beneficial to a patient. The determination
rests upon whether the treatment is proportionate or dispropor-
tionate in terms of the benefits gained versus the burdens
caused.15 0 A proportionate treatment is a treatment that has at
least a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, and
the benefits outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment.'5 '
In Barber, the court ruled. that the doctors' conduct was lawful
because the benefits provided by the intravenous treatment were
disproportionately small as compared to the expected burdens.
3 2
The court also addressed the question of who should make
this vital determination.' 35 The court concluded that the medical
diagnoses and prognoses must be made by the treating physician
under the generally accepted standards of medical practice in the
community, and, whenever possible, the patient himself should
then make the ultimate decision.' M If -the patient is incompe-
tent, the court held that a court appointed surrogate decision-
maker or the patient's immediate family, in consultation with the




127 Id. at 490.
128 Id. at 493-94.
129 Id. at 490-91.
130 Id at 491.
131 Id.
132 Id at 491-92.
133 Id. at 492.
134 Id.
135 I at 494.
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The Barber court further noted that any surrogate decision-
maker should be guided by their knowledge of the patient's de-
sires and feelings, if they were expressed before the patient be-
came incompetent. If the patient's desires are unascertainable, the
surrogate should base her decision on the patient's best inter-
ests. l"' The court held that judicial approval is not necessary be-
fore decisions to withdraw medical treatment are made.
137
The court concluded that Mr. Herbert's family, in conjunction
with the attending physicians, were the proper decision-makers.
There was evidence that Mr. Herbert had expressed to his wife,
before he became incapacitated, that he would not want to be
kept alive by machines.1 31 Therefore, the doctors' omission to
continue treatment under the circumstances was not an unlawful
failure to perform a legal duty.
13 9
C. Durable Power of Attorney Statutes.
A power of attorney is a legal instrument that gives an agent
legal authority to act on behalf of the principal. Authority to act
under a common law power of attorney terminates when the prin-
cipal becomes incompetent. 4 ° This limitation makes the com-
mon law power of attorney useless as a tool to plan for loss of
competency.
Today all states have durable power of attorney statutes,
141
and many are modeled after the Uniform Durable Power of Attor-
ney Act.44 Durable power of attorney statutes provide an alterna-
tive to court-ordered, protective procedures, 143 like guardianship,
to deal with an individual's financial affairs. Durable power statutes
were not originally designed to deal with personal care deci-
sions.144 However, there is no reason why a durable power of at-
torney cannot be used for such matters.
145
136 Id. at 493. This is significant because the court endorses two standards for making
this decision. If the incompetent patient's desires are ascertainable, the court advocates
using the "substituted judgment" approach. See supra note 33. If the patient's desires





140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 120, 122 (1957).
141 See Saunders v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
142 8A U.L.A. 275 (1983).
143 Id. at 276.
144 MEISEL, supra note 9, at 331.
145 See Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing An Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84
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A rapidly increasing number of states have enacted statutes
that expressly provide for health care durable powers of
attorney. 46 Some health care power of attorney statutes deal ex-
clusively with health care decisions, while others have a specific
health care provision in their general durable power of attorney
statute. In a few states, the general durable power of attorney
statutes do not mention health care decision-making, but they can
be used to appoint health care agents because separate, and more
recent, statutes specifically authorize such use.
147
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE.
This Part will focus on problems that arose and questions that
were left open when state legislatures enacted statutes creating
mechanisms to exercise the right to efuse medical treatment. In
general, action by state legislatures has added a measure of cer-
tainty to this unsetded area of law. However, their efforts have
generated new, questions and ignored old issues.
COLUM. L. REv. 985 (1984).
146 ALAsKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201 (Supp.
1991)(as interpreted by Rasmussen v. Flemming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987)); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 20-17-202(b) (Supp. 1991); CAL. CIrv. CODE § 2430 (West Supp. 1992); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-501 (West.1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-43 (West Supp.
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(b) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2205 (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-1 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §
327D-26(1) (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 100 1/2,
para. 804-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-6 (West 1992); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 633.705 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-625 (Supp. 1990); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.970 (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(C)(1)
(West Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (West Supp. 1991); MD. CODE
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-601 (1991); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 201D, § 1 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06.2 (West Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
151 (Supp. 1991); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.800 (Michie 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
46:2B-8 (West 1989)(as interpreted by In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (NJ. 1987)); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-5-501 (Michie 1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2980 (McKinney Supp. 1992);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-2(9) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11 (Andersen Supp.
1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5604 (Supp. 1991); R.I.
GEN LAWS § 23-4.10-1 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-5-501 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 59-7-2.1 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-201 (1991); TEX. CIrV.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.001 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1106 (Supp.
1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3451 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (Michie 1989);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.94.010 (West 1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-1 (1991); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 155.01 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 35-22-102(d) (1988).
147 Usually, durable power of attorney statutes combine with living will statutes (see,
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1, 16-8-12-6 (West 1992)) or surrogate decision-making
statutes (see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.7.1, 633.705 (West Supp. 1991); MD. CODE
ANN., EsT. & TRUsTS §§ 13601, 13-602 (1990); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-107(d)
(1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9.1, 37.1-134.4.B (1989)) to reach this result.
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A. Who can refuse medical treatment?
The first issue this Note addresses is who has the right to
refuse what medical treatment under the statutes and when. This
is really an old issue that the legislatures ignored and not a new
question generated by the statutes. In most of the living will stat-
utes the answer to this question lies in the statutory definitions of
"qualified patient," "terminal condition," and "life-sustaining proce-
dure."148
The focus of this question is who is excluded from the group
described in the statutory definitions. This Note evaluates the state
statutes by looking for the answer to one of the most troubling
questions in this area of the law: can an incompetent person, who
is in a persistent vegetative state, refuse artificial nutrition and
hydration in advance pursuant to the state statute?
1. The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URTIA)1
49
The definitions in the URTIA are typical of those found in
state statutes, 150  however there are substantial differences in
some states. The definitions of "life-sustaining treatment," 5'
"qualified patient," '152 and "terminal condition"153 are interrelat-
ed. To determine the definition of "terminal condition," we must
replace the term "life-sustaining treatment" with its definition. To
determine who is a "qualified patient," we must substitute the
definition of "terminal condition" for the term "terminal condi-
tion." This produces: a qualified patient is a patient who is at least
eighteen years old, who has executed a declaration, and who has
been determined by his attending physician to have an incurable
or irreversible condition, that without the administration of a
148 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
149 9B U.LA. 609 (1987).
150 The 1985 URTIA was based upon existing legislation. See 9B U.L.A. 609
(1987) (prefatory note). Eight states have adopted either the 1985 or 1989 version of the
URTIA. Id. The definitions in both versions of the URTIA are the same. Id.
151 "Life-sustaining treatment" means any medical procedure or intervention that,
when administered to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the process of dying.
UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT § 1(3), 9B U.L.A. 611 (1987).
152 "Qualified patient" means a patient [18] or more years of age who has executed
a declaration and who has been determined by the attending physician to be in a termi-
nal condition. Id. at § 1(7).
153 "Terminal condition" means an incurable or irreversible condition that, without
the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will in the opinion of the attending physi-
cian, result in death within a relatively short time. Id. at § 1(9).
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medical procedure or intervention which will only prolong the
process of dying, will, in the opinion of his physician, result in
death within a relatively short time.
Can an incompetent patient refuse artificial nutrition and
hydration under this statute? If the patient is at least eighteen
years old and has executed an advance directive, he might be able
to. The incompetent patient can refuse artificial nutrition and
hydration only if providing artificial nutrition and hydration is
considered life-sustaining treatment; however, the URTIA, like
most state statutes, is not clear about whether artificial nutrition
and hydration is a life-sustaining treatment.
2. States which allow refusal of artificial nutrition and hydration.
Some states specifically allow individuals to refuse artificial
nutrition and hydration." 4 The Alaska Rights of the Terminally
Ill Act specifically states that "It]he declaration may provide that
the declarant does not want nutrition or hydration administered
intravenously or by gastric tube."155 The Colorado Medical Treat-
ment Decision Act states that a declaration can, in the event that
the only procedure being provided is artificial nutrition, direct the
artificial nourishment not be continued, be provided only for a
specified period of time, or that the artificial nutrition be contin-
ued.
156
The Minnesota Adult Care Decisions Act provides that a dec-
laration "must state the declarant's preferences regarding whether
the declarant wishes to receive or not receive artificial administra-
tion of nutrition and hydration" or appoint a proxy to make this
decision.157 The* Idaho Natural Death Act provides a statutory liv-
ing will; in paragraph one of the suggested living will form,
154 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202 (Supp.
1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-101 (West 1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4502 (Supp.
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701(b)(4) (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145B.01 (West Supp. 1992).
155 ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.040(b) (1991).
156 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2.5)(a) (West Supp. 1991). The statute also
says that when an attending physician determines that pain results from the discontinua-
tion of artificial nourishment, the doctor may order that nourishment be provided to the
extent necessary to provide comfort and alleviate pain. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-
104(2.6) (West Supp. 1991).
157 MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03(2)(b) (West Supp. 1992).
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declarants are given the choice of accepting or rejecting artificial
nutrition and hydration by checking a box.15
3. States which do not allow refusal of artificial nutrition and
hydration.
Some states specifically prohibit directives that would instruct
health care providers to forego artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion.159 However, it is important to realize that if the statute
does not preempt common law rights, a directive made pursuant
to common law doctrines, and not the statute, may be enforce-
able.
160
4. States where it is uncertain if you can refuse artificial nutrition
and hydration.
Some statutes are not clear about whether their statutorily
authorized advanced directives allow for refusal of artificial nutri-
tion and hydration. Many states have merely adopted the defini-
tions from the URTIA16 exactly, or with alterations not relevant
here. The URTIA states that its provisions do not affect the re-
sponsibility of providing artificial nutrition and hydration.
162
Since the statute does not address this issue, one must search
through court decisions in a jurisdiction to see if the courts have
addressed it.
In other states the legislature has failed to coordinate the
various "right to die" statutes. This failure has generated uncertain-
ty. The Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act
clearly states that artificial nutrition and hydration is not a life-
158 IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1991).
159 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(4) (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(b)
(Michie Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570(1) (West 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.03(3) (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5)(a) (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §
327D-2 (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 702(2)(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-4 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(5) (West 1989); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(1) (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon Supp.
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(2) (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2 (Supp.
1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102(4) (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §
127.605(3) (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-20(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1103(6)(b) (Supp. 1991); Wise. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5) (West 1989); WYO.
STAT. § 35-22-101(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(E)
(Anderson Supp. 1990) (health care durable power of attorney statute prohibits the refusal
of artificial nutrition and hydration unless certain conditions are met).
160 See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
162 UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL Acr § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. 609, 617 (1987).
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prolonging procedure which can be refused in a statutory living
will. 6 The Indiana Health Care Consent Act'6 allows adults
to appoint health care representatives to consent, on their behalf,
to health care if the appointor becomes incompetent. The appoin-
tors can give their health care representatives instruction regarding
which procedures to accept and which to refuse, and under what
circumstances.'65 Unfortunately, the definition of health care in
the Health Care Consent Act is silent as to whether artificial nutri-
tion and hydration are included in or excluded from the types of
treatment that may be refused by the representative.
66
This could mean that the state legislature intended to allow
its adult citizens to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration by
appointing a health care representative, but not by executing a
living will. Although this is not a logical proposition, if the legisla-
ture wanted to exclude administration of artificial nutrition and
hydration from the definition of "health care" in the Health Care
Consent Act, all it had to do was say: "health care has the same
meaning set forth in IC 16-8-11-5."' The only logical inference
is that the legislature did not intend the definitions to be the
same. This leads to the absurd result that one can refuse artificial
nutrition and hydration by appointing a health care agent, but not
by executing a living will. 6 However, this is the law in Indiana
after the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in In the Matter of Sue
Ann Lawrance.
169
Sue Ann Lawrance was a forty-two year old woman who was in
a persistent vegetative state for over four years. 70 Sue Ann's par-
ents sought to discontinue her artifically provided nutrition and
163 IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-4 (West 1992). The definition of life-prolonging pro-
cedure specifically excludes artificial nutrition and hydration.
164 IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-1 (West 1992).
165 Id. at § 16-8-12-6(d).
165 Id. at § 16-8-12-1(2).
167 In fict, the legislature showed it was familiar with this technique in the definition
of "health care provider" in the Health Care Consent Act. See Id. at § 16-8-12-1(3).
168 The statute itself resolves the argument that the definition of health care in the
Health Care Consent Act reflects a change in policy, and that the legislature intended to
allow refusal of artificial nutrition and hydration by using either a living will or a health
care agent. The Health Care Consent Act states that it does not affect Indiana law con-
cerning an individual's authorization to make a health care decision for himself, or an-
other, or to provide, withdraw, or withhold medical care necessary to prolong or sustain
life. See Id. at § 16-8-12-11(a).
169 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991).
170 Id. at 34.
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hydration.171 Sue Ann had suffered permanent brain damage as
a child; she was never competent to make her own health care
decisions.
1 72
The Indiana Supreme Court faced the issue of whether the
Indiana Health Care Consent Act applied where the family of a
never-competent patient in a persistent vegetative state sought to
withdraw the patient's artificially provided nutrition and hydra-
tion. 73 The main question was whether artificial nutrition and
hydration falls within the definition of health care found in the
Health Care Consent Act.
The court noted that artificial nutrition and hydration is not
included in or excluded from the definition of health care in the
Health Care Consent Act.174 The court decided that the legisla-
ture intended the act to be a procedural statute which did not af-
fect the substantive rights of Indiana citizens.17' The court then
reviewed Indiana common law and statutory law to determine if
the right to refuse medical treatment is a substantive. right in
Indiana.176 The court decided that it was, and then addressed
the question of whether artificial nutrition and hydration falls
within the definition of such treatment.177 Based on the view of
the Indiana medical community, statutory law,' and court deci-
sions from other jurisdictions, the court decided that artificial
nutrition and hydration is medical treatment which can be re-
fused.
79
Following the Lawrance decision, Indiana residents can refuse
artificial nutrition and hydration if they appoint a health care
agent pursuant to the Indiana Health Care Consent Act. However,
171 Id. at 35.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 37.
174 Id. at 38.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 38-39.
177 Id. at 39.
178 The court seemed to ignore the clear position the Indiana legislature took on
this issue in the Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures AcL The legislature
explicitly excluded artificial nutrition and hydration from the definition of life-prolonging
procedure. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-4 (West 1992). Moreover, the Indiana legisla-
ture has reiterated its position since the Lawrance decision. On January 22, 1992, , the
Indiana House of Representatives defeated a bill which would have allowed Indiana citi-
zens to use a living will to request a doctor to withhold artificial nutrition and hydration
if they were diagnosed with a terminal illness or in a persistent vegetative state. Susan
Dillman, Living Wilts Bill Seen Lost To Lobbying, S. BEND TRIB., Jan. 23, 1992, at C2.
179 Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 39.
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Indiana residents cannot refuse artificial nutrition and hydration
by executing a living will because the Indiana Living Will Act
explicitly excludes the provision of nutrition and hydration from
the act's definition of life-prolonging procedures which can be
refused.18 0
The Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act"' and the Okla-
homa Natural Death Act8 2 present another peculiar exercise in
statutory construction. Both statutes define "medical care"' in a
way that may mean a qualified patient can refuse some kinds of
artificial nutrition and hydration by advanced directive, but not
others. In Tennessee, "medical care" expressly includes artificial or
forced feeding, and medical care can be refused, but the defini-
tion also states: "[i]n no case shall this section be interpreted to
allow the withholding of simple nourishment or fluids so as to
condone death by starvation or dehydration.' 184 This section may
mean that a qualified patient can direct the withholding of artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration provided by intrusive medical proce-
dures, such as a jejunostomy tube,8 5 but the declarant cannot
direct the withholding of ordinary oral feeding that includes no
medical procedures. Whether the statute would permit foregoing
of other, less intrusive procedures, such as an intravenous drip or
nasogastric tube, is not clear."8 6
B. Are statutes which authorize the use of an advance directive
the exclusive method for refusing medical treatment?
The previous section considered the question of who is a
qualified patient under natural death acts. In some states, incom-
180 The court tried to explain this disparity in a footnote: "Enacted two years later
[than the Living Will Act], the H[ealth] Clare] C[onsent] A[ct] contained no such ex-
clusion, suggesting that the legislature never intended to exclude artificial nutrition and
hydration from the HCCA's definition of health care." Id. at 40, n. 5.
181 TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-101 (Supp. 1991).
182 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101 (Supp. 1991).
183 Oklahoma uses the term "life-sustaining procedure". OKLA. STAT. ANN. ti. 63, §
3102(4) (Supp. 1991).
184 TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(5) (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added).
185 A jejunostomy tube is a method of providing artificial nutrition and hydration. An
opening through the abdominal wall into the jejunum is surgically created and a tube is
inserted. Nutrition and hydration are fed into the patient through this tube.
186 See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 370. Oklahoma's statute states: "Life-sustaining proce-
dure shall not include the administration of medication or the performance of any medi-
cal procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain nor the normal consumption of food
and water." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102(4) (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added). The
interpretation of "normal" consumption raises the same issue as the Tennessee statute.
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petent patients can refuse artificial nutrition and hydration, while
in other states they cannot; some states' statutes are unclear. This
section considers whether individuals who want to plan their med-
ical affairs in case of later incompetency have alternatives if their
state statutes prohibit the use of living wills as a means to refuse
artificial nutrition and hydration. This question can be restated as:
Are natural death acts, living will acts, and durable power of attor-
ney statutes the exclusive source of the right to refuse medical
treatment?
Part II of this Note discusses the three bases for the right to
refuse medical treatment: the constitutional right of privacy, the
common law doctrine of informed consent, and state statutes.1
8 7
Do state statutes preempt the other bases? Clearly a state statute
cannot preempt rights protected by the state constitution without
a compelling state interest.88 However, relatively few states have
found the right to refuse medical treatment protected under their
state constitution."' The more troubling question is: Do statuto-
ry rights preempt common law rights? The answer differs from
state to state.
The URTIA says that the act does not supercede common law
rights. 9 All of the states that have adopted the URTIA use this
language. 91 Some statutes not modeled after the URTIA clearly
state that the statute does not affect common law rights.
19 2
Some statutes do not address this issue."' In so doing, the
187 See supra notes 19-51 and accompanying text.
188 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ. 1976)("We think that the state's inter-
est [in favor of prolonging life] weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a
point at which the individual's rights overcome the State interest.").
189 See supra note 22.
190 UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT (1985) § 10(e), 9B U.L.A. 609, 621
(1987). See also UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT (1989) § 11(e), 9B U.L.A.
609 (Supp. 1991)("This act does not impair or supercede any right or responsibility that
a person has to effect the withholding or withdrawal of medical care.").
191 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.080 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-910(e) (Supp.
1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.11 (West 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-711(e)
(West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.055(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-9-205(5) (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-11.5 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. it.
63, § 3110(b) (West Supp. 1992).
192 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-9(d) (1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7193
(West Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2429(a) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.15 (West
1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-11 (1991); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-610(1)
(1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:12 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-110(d)
(Supp. 1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.021 (West 1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2:1117(4) (Supp. 1991).
193 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
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legislatures have left the 'question open for judicial construction.
Most courts have held that natural death acts do not preempt
common law rights or state constitutional rights to refuse medical
treatment.
1 9 4
In Cruzan v. Harmon,95 the Missouri Supreme Court's dis-
cussion of the relationship between its' living-will statute and com-
mon law principles illustrates the complexity of the issue.196 The
court stated: 'We intend no judgment here as to whether the
common law right to refuse medical treatment is broader than the
Living Will statute." 9 7 However, the court also said
[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the right of privacy may be exercised
by a third party in the absence of strict formalities assigning
that right, the risk of arbitrary decisionmaking and grave con-
sequences attaches all the more when the third party seeks to
cause the death of an incompetent. . . no person can assume
that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formali-
ties under Missouri's Living Will Statutes or the clear and con-
vincing, inherently reliable evidence absent here.
198
The court seems to say that even though the common law
right to refuse medical treatment may allow third parties to refuse
medical treatment on behalf of another, if the patient is incompe-
tent, a third party can refuse medical treatment on the patient's
behalf only if the patient has executed- a living will, or if there is
clear and convincing evidence that the patient would refuse such
treatment.
The Missouri Rights of the Terminally Ill Act,' 99 which pro-
vides the statutory basis for living wills, specifically prevents
570 (West 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.01b (Supp. 1991).
194 In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987), modied, 757 P.2d 534 (1988). Cf.
McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 602 (Conn. 1989)
("When the legislature has attempted to respond to this urgent request for statutory
assistance, we have an obligation to pursue the applicability of statutory criteria before
resorting to an exploration of residual common law rights, if any such rights indeed re-
main."); compare Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) and
Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) with Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nora., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110
S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
195 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affld sub nom., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
196 Missouri's Rights of the Terminally Ill Act did not apply in this case; the statute
took effect after Nancy Cruzan's car accident. Id. at 420.
197 Id,
198 Id. at 425.
199 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (Verhon Supp. 1992).
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declarants from directing the withholding or withdrawal of artifi-
cial nutrition or hydration."' Therefore, the only way for a per-
son, planning for future incompetence, to refuse artificial nutri-
tion and hydration is by meeting the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard.20 1
This is not the same as saying that the common law rights are
only enforceable through the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act.
However, incompetent patients can only exercise their rights
through the act or by satisfying a heightened evidentiary standard.
The court announced that the clear and convincing evidence
standard applied to cases involving the right to refuse medical
treatment in Cruzan;°2 the application of this standard to such
issues has no precedential basis. Further, the court considered the
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act "an expression of the policy of
this state with regard to the sanctity of life." 03 A fair interpreta-
tion of this result is that the court curtailed the common law right
in the case of incompetent patients because of the State's strong
interest in life. The common law rights are barely broader than
the statutory rights; an incompetent patient's right to refuse medi-
cal treatment can only be exercised on the basis of compliance
with the statute or if there is clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's wishes.
In order to eliminate the confusion illustrated in Cruzan v.
Harmon, state legislatures should clarify the relationship between
the rights afforded by statute and common law rights. The easiest
way for state legislatures to do this is to include a section in the
statute which unambiguously states the relationship of the statuto-
rily created rights and the common law of the state.
204
200 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992) ("Death-prolonging proce-
dure shall not include . . . the performance of any procedure to provide nutrition or hy-
dration."). A declarant can only direct the withholding or withdrawal of death-prolonging
procedures. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.015 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
201 This standard is not an unconstitutional obstacle to the exercise of a constitution-
ally protected right. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
202 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 425.
203 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 420. See also Id. at 421 ("Missouri's statute, . . . is modeled
after URITA [sic], but with substantial modifications which reflect this State's strong in-
terest in life.").
204 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.11.5 (West 1989)("This chapter shall not be
interpreted to increase or decrease the right of a patient to make decisions regarding
use of life-sustaining procedures as long as the patient is able to do so, nor to impair or
supercede any right or responsibility that any person has to effect the withholding or
withdrawal of medical care in any lawful manner. In that respect, the provisions of this
chapter are cumulative.").
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C. Do states enforce statutory advance directives executed in other states?
Even if an advance directive is valid and enforceable in the
state where it is executed, the declarant may be outside of that
jurisdiction when the directive needs to be enforced. The declar-
ant might move to another state following the execution of the
advance directive. One would hope that an individual, who is con-
scientious enough to meet the statutory requirements in one state,
would be conscientious enough to reexecute the directive in com-
pliance with the laws of his new home. However, a declarant may
simply be driving through or visiting a foreign jurisdiction when a
tragedy occurs.
What can the declarant do to ensure that his wishes will be
observed in a foreign state? First, a declarant can include a provi-
sion which states that the directive is intended to be enforceable
in all jurisdictions, not just his home state. Second, the declarant
should try to comply with the formalities of execution for the
most stringent American jurisdiction. 5 With these exceptions,
there is very little individuals can do to guarantee that their di-
rective will be honored unless the state legislature, in the state
where the directive is to be enforced, has addressed this question.
Statutes which authorize the execution of advance directives
should explicitly state whether or not this state will recognize and
enforce directives executed in another state. Some states, but very
few, have addressed this question.
206
The URTIA provides that declarations executed in another
state in compliance with the law of that state or with the law of
this state are validly executed.20 7 Six of the eight jurisdictions
that have adopted one of the versions of the URTIA provide for
declarations executed in a foreign jurisdiction. 20 8 Two states
205 See MEISEL, supra note 9, at 394.
206 See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
207 UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL Acr (1985) § 12, 9B U.L.A. 609, 621
(1987).- See also UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL Acr (1989) § 13, 9B U.L.A. 609
(Supp. 1991).
208 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.090 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-212 (Michie Supp.
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit., 18-A, § 5-713 (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §
50-9-111 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-13 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103.1
(West Supp. 1992). Some of these states require that execution comport with its law; oth-
ers require execution to comply with its law or the law of the state in which it was exe-
cuted.
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which adopted the URTIA2° did not adopt the URTIA provision
regarding foreign directives; presumably, these states chose not to
recognize foreign declarations.
At least three states,2 10 which have natural death legislation
but did not adopt the URTIA, have included a provision allowing
foreign directives to be effective if they meet their statutory re-
quirements, or the requirements of the state of execution.
State legislatures should adopt a provision which would allow
foreign directives to be enforced in their state. The purposes of
the statutory formalities can be met this way, while respecting the
wishes of the declarant.
V. CONCLUSION.
The decision to consent or not consent to life-sustaining treat-
ment is a right of the terminally ill patient. The vast majority of
state legislatures have recognized this right, and have enacted
legislation which provides for an enforceable method to exercise
it. Further legislative action is needed for two reasons: First, courts
in those states without living will statutes may not respect a
patient's treatment decisions without legislative guidelines;211 sec-
ond, patients in states with living will statutes may not have their
decisions carried out because of definitional gaps created by -poor
drafting.
The goal of each state legislature should be to enact laws that
will clarify the rights of patients and set forth procedures to exer-
cise these rights. The legislatures should measure their success by
the number of families that have to go through painful and ex-
pensive court proceedings to have the wishes of a family member
honored. The standard to determine success should be high; if
even one person has to go through the judicial process because
the legislature did not act, or acted carelessly, the legislature has
failed.
Edward J. O'Brien
209 Iowa and Missouri.
210 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3211 (Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.17
(West Supp. 1991); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-612 (1990).
211 This issue should be addressed by the legislature rather than the courts. See Ber-
nard K Freamon, Death With Dignity Laws: A Plea For Uniform Legislation, 5 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 105 (1982).
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